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1. Introduction
This article reviews the applications of three transgender persons to have their new identi-
ficatory details recorded in the relevant population registry, and to have suitably adjusted
identity documents issued in consequence. However, the law of marriage seemed to stand
in their way. Related issues have been raised in foreign courts, which are discussed in the
second part of this article. It is argued that, although the decision in KOS v Minister of
Home Affairs1 was undoubtedly correct on human rights grounds, the implications of the
decision affects the interplay between the law of marriage and civil unions where a sex
reassignment takes place during the subsistence of an existing marriage.
1.1 The basis of the application
The first, third and fifth applicants2 were persons who had undergone a sex change by
reason of the fact that they were transgender. The Alteration of Sex Description and
Sex Status Act 49 of 2003 (hereafter Alteration Act) provides for the formal recogni-
tion, recording and legal consequences of a transition from one gender to another. It
allows for the alteration of the person’s sex description on the birth register and for an
amended birth certificate to be issued. The person is then deemed for all purposes
henceforth to be a person of the altered sex description: the altered sex description
operates entirely prospectively. This is confirmed by s 3(3) of the Alteration Act, which
provides that the alteration does not adversely affect rights and obligations that have
accrued before the alteration is recorded.3
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1 KOS v Minister of Home Affairs 2017 (6) SA 588 (WCC).
2 The second, fourth and sixth applicants were respectively their lawful spouses.
3 See in general for a discussion of this Act, C Visser & E Picarra ‘Victor, Victoria or V: A constitutional perspective on
transsexuality’ (2012) 28 South African Journal on Human Rights 506. This article gives a good historical overview
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The effect of an alteration on the birth register has implications for the details
recorded on the population register.4 The Department of Home Affairs maintains the
latter register in accordance with the Identification Act 68 of 1997; s 8 of this Act
requires that the register contain details of person’s names, dates of birth, gender and
identity number.5 If applicable, details of a person’s marriage contained in the relevant
marriage register are also included in the population register.
The law requires everyone over the age of sixteen to have an identification book
(now card), reflecting their identificatory particulars, including a photograph. As is
well known, practically, an ID is an essential vade mecum of everyday life in South
Africa, from opening a bank account to renting or buying a property to receiving a reg-
istered parcel at the post office. Section 19 read with Chapters 4 and 5 of the
Identification Act requires that if one’s particulars are not correctly reflected on one’s
ID, an application for a revised ID document or card must be brought. Thus, anyone
who has transitioned to a new gender would be obliged to apply for a new identity
document reflecting their revised ID number, with a different gender-related figure
code.6 In order for that to occur, it is logical that an application under the Alteration
Act would have had to precede this process of acquiring an ID document, which could
then be reflective of the correct details as to gender.
The applicants, in this case, had applied for an alteration of their sex descriptions in
terms of the Alteration Act but came up against a range of bureaucratic problems. In
short, in KOS, the Department of Home Affairs regarded the alteration of their sex in
the register as incompatible with the continued existence of their marriages solemnised
under the Marriage Act 25 of 1961.7 This incompatibility results from the ‘marriage’,
after a successful application for a gender alteration, no longer being one between one
man and one woman, but between two women, contrary to the provision in s 30(1) of
the Marriage Act. This Act contains the well-known marriage formula ending with ‘Do
you, A.B., declare as far as you know there is no lawful impediment to your proposed
marriage with C.D. here present, and that you call all here present to witness that you
take C.D. as your lawful wife (or husband)?’
It was common ground that all three couples were married, that the respective
spouses were content with their spouses’ transition, and all wished to remain married;
further, it is axiomatic that a lawful marriage can be dissolved only by death or
divorce.8 The Alteration Act contains no requirement that an alteration can be effected
only in respect of a single or divorced person (see Section 2 for the position in
Germany prior to and after a constitutional challenge).
4 This follows from s 5 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 52 of 1992.
5 An identity number does not reflect marital status. It does, however, reflect gender through the assignment of
a gender-specific code as part of the ID number.
6 The failure by a person who has transitioned to obtain a new identification document is a criminal offence under the
Identification Act. According to the judgment in KOS, the word ‘gender’ is used in the Identification Act to the same
effect as the expression ‘sex description’ is in the Alteration Act. Sex/gender classification in terms of the
Identification Act currently operates on a binary model. Everyone is either male or female. An application would
have to be brought under the Alteration Act prior to the change of gender under the identification Act (KOS par
6 and 7.) See s 19 read with Chapters 4 and 5 of the Identification Act.
7 See KOS (n 1 above) para 13 for a summary.
8 Divorce Act 70 of 1979 s 3–5.
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Yet the Department’s reading that effecting an alteration was incompatible with the
existing marriage9 had the following material result: in respect of two applicants, the
application under the Alteration Act was refused due to the subsistence of the existing
marriages under the Marriage Act. In respect of the third application, the Department
did grant the application to change the sex description. But, at the same time, the
Department deleted the details of the marriage to the applicant’s wife as recorded in
the population register: a kind of ‘administrative divorce’ was imposed upon them.10
The population register was altered to reflect that they had never been married. The
(former) wife’s married name was also unilaterally changed back to her maiden name
in the register. A seventh applicant, a member of a non-governmental organisation
dealing with transgender issues, deposed to a previous incident of a client in 2009,
where an applicant under the Alteration Act had had her marriage record dating back
to 1976 changed, without her knowledge, to a civil union, purportedly solemnised in
terms of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006!
1.2 The finding of the court
As Binns Ward AJ notes, the Department’s response was premised on its understand-
ing of the current matrimonial regime established by the Marriage Act read alongside
the Civil Union Act. The latter was born out of the unconstitutional discrimination
against same-sex couples (as found by the Constitutional Court in Lesbian and Gay
Equality Project v Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Home Affairs v Fourie)11
inherent in the restriction of civil marriages concluded in terms of the Marriage Act to
one man and one woman. In curing the constitutional defect that prohibited same-sex
marriage, Parliament chose not to ‘read in’ the gender neutral phrase ‘or spouse’ after
‘man and wife’ in the marriage formula, but to enact complementary, but separate,
legislation to cure the constitutional incompatibility of the exclusion of same-sex cou-
ples from the institution of marriage. Since the Act came into force on 30 November
2006, it has been possible for same-sex couples (and heterosexual couples) to conclude
a civil union, which they can call a civil partnership or a marriage.12 Accordingly, het-
erosexual would-be spouses have a choice as to which Act they intend to use to solem-
nise their union, while same-sex couples do not.13 The meaning of the term ‘marriage’
is that accorded at common law, as no definition of marriage is provided in either the
Marriage Act or the Civil Union Act.14
The judgment ably sets out the whole saga of bureaucratic hurdles faced by each of
the applicants seeking to use the mechanism of the Alteration Act, ranging from an
9 KOS (n 1 above) paras 14, 15, 27 and 29.
10 One difficulty raised by the Department was the incompatibility of its data systems to reflect the particulars of
same-sex couples married under the Marriage Act: ibid para 28. This was put forward more than once by the
Department, although marital status is not a component of an identification number.
11 See generally, Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister for Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC); Minister for Home
Affairs v Fourie 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC).
12 Civil Union Act s 11(1).
13 KOS (n 1 above) para 23.
14 See s 13 of the Civil Union Act, quoted in full in footnote 34 of the KOS judgment, to the effect that any
reference to marriage in any other law, including the common law, includes, with such changes as may be
required by the context, a civil union.
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official telling one applicant that such an application must be illegal, to missing files
and papers, to a suggestion that proof of sex reassignment surgery must first be
adduced (which is not a requirement under the Alteration Act). The final straw was
the requirement of proof of a divorce, on the basis that two persons of the same sex
could not be married to each other under the Marriage Act. It was even suggested by
an official that the couple divorce and then remarry under the Civil Union Act, as the
computer programmes would not accept the gender coded ID details of two persons of
the same gender married according to the Marriage Act.15
Among the relief applied for was an order requiring the respondent Department to
alter their sex descriptions in accordance with the Alteration Act, irrespective of their
marital status; an order declaring that the respondents’ refusal to process their applica-
tions on the basis of their marriage under the Marriage Act was unlawful and unconsti-
tutional; and an order directing that the deregistration of the marriage between the
fifth and sixth applicant was also to be declared unlawful and unconstitutional and that
the population register be altered to reflect that they are married to each other.
The respondent Department argued that the sex alteration of one partner ‘converted’
the marriage into a same-sex marriage; however, it averred that the law does not pro-
vide a mechanism to convert a marriage under the Marriage Act into one under the
Civil Union Act. While accepting that there is nothing in the Alteration Act that
touches on marital status of applicants seeking an alteration of their gender, the
respondents nevertheless argued that ‘the issues presented by this matter cannot be
viewed in isolation solely through the lens of the Alteration Act’ and that the current
matter involves a question of marital status.16 The Director General continued that the
Department would have no problem were the Court to ‘declare the Civil Union Act
unconstitutional for its failure to recognise as a valid marriage (either in its own right
or by converting a marriage concluded under the Marriage Act) the marriage of two
persons who were married as a heterosexual couple under the Marriage Act, and
where, subsequent to such marriage, one person to that marriage registers a sex alter-
ation on the Birth Register pursuant to the Alteration Act’.17 In short, the Department
was of the view that under the current legislative framework, a same-sex couple cannot
remain in a marriage concluded under the Marriage Act when one partner alters their
legal gender.
The learned judge points neatly to the inconsistencies and flawed thinking of the
Department, which tendered to restore the marriage registration of the fifth and sixth
applicants, but subject to a simultaneous reversal of the sex change already recorded in
the population register by virtue of the Alteration Act. This line of reasoning flies in
the face of the earlier argument of the respondent Department that a same-sex couple
cannot remain in a marriage under the Marriage Act, since the effect of the tendered
option would be to sanction a union under the Marriage Act between two persons
(now) of the same sex.
15 To which the applicant retorted that she would not get a divorce in order to satisfy a computer system (see KOS
(n 1 above) para 46).
16 Ibid para 62.
17 Ibid para 64.
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In considering whether the assertion that there was indeed a legislative lacuna
involving the marital status of transgendered persons was true, the Court points out
that the sole criterion that the Alteration Act provides for is proof, to the reasonable
satisfaction of the Director General, that the applicant has altered their sex or gender.18
The import of the objection of the Department appeared to rest on s 30(1) of the
Marriage Act, which contains the formula (set out above) to be used when solemnising
a marriage. Solemnise, the Court said, meant ‘duly perform (a ceremony, especially
that of marriage)’. Hence, the section has no bearing on the legal effects of a marriage
already solemnised. The Marriage Act also contains no provisions on the consequences
of a legal marriage, as these derive from common law.19 Nor does the Marriage Act
contain any prohibition on a spouse undergoing a sex change (which, as the judge cor-
rectly notes, would violate the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 in
any event if it were to so prescribe).20 Accordingly, there is no justification for connect-
ing s 30(1) of the Marriage Act with the Alteration Act.
Section 29 of the Marriage Act provides for the registration of marriages solemnised
under the Act. The legal and practical effect of the section, opined the judge, is to cre-
ate an official record of the marriage having been solemnised as a historical fact.21 It
too has no bearing on the legal consequences of a marriage.
Turning to the Civil Union Act, the Court examines its objects as set out in the long
title, and concludes that there is no parallel system of civil marriage as contended by
the respondents, only two parallel systems of solemnisation and registration.22
Accordingly, there is no scope for a ‘conversion’ of one form of solemnised marriage
into another form of solemnised marriage. Solemnisation, in short, is a historical fact.
The refusal to process the applications of the first and third applicants under the
Alteration Act was, therefore, found to be in contravention of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.23 The alteration of the marriage records of the fifth
and sixth applicants was found to have no basis in law, and was set aside for being in
breach of the doctrine of legality.24 The order confirmed the constitutional invalidity of
the respondent’s actions in that they violated the applicants’ rights to equality and to dig-
nity.25 The Department was ordered to consider the applications under the Alteration Act
of the first and third applicants, and to reinstate on the population register the details of
the marriage previously solemnised in respect of the fifth and sixth applicants.26
18 Ibid para 73.
19 And are the same for marriages or civil partnerships concluded under the Civil Union Act.
20 KOS (n 1 above) para 82.
21 Ibid para 83.
22 Ibid para 85.
23 Ibid para 87.
24 Ibid para 88.
25 These rights are not discussed in the judgment. However, drawing from the Gay and Lesbian Equality case (n 11
above), differential treatment will constitute unfair discrimination when the affected group suffers from pre-
existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping or prejudice. These factors are relevant because, to the extent
that the claimant is already subject to unfair circumstances or treatment in society by virtue of personal
characteristics or circumstances, they would often have a history of not having been given equal concern, respect
and consideration (at para 66 E-F). Dignity is impugned, as non-recognition of their right to family life
perpetuates and reinforces existing prejudice against homosexual people (and the same would be the case for
transgender persons).
26 In March 2019, it was confirmed by the advocate who acted for the applicants that the Department had at that
point not yet complied with the order of the court.
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2. Consideration of foreign case law
In Germany, the position until 2008 was that in order for a person’s altered gender to
be officially recorded (as opposed to just a change of name, which was a kind of soft
option under the law),27 proof of divorce and of an inability to procreate (infertility)
had to be furnished to the authorities. This was ruled unconstitutional by the German
Constitutional Court,28 in that the requirement of divorce prior to a change of gender
being recorded was a violation of the right to equality. The applicant, who was born in
1929, had been married for 56 years. His marriage produced three children. He had felt
that he belonged to the female gender for a long time. Since 2001, he had held a fore-
name typically gendered as a female one on the basis of a court ruling according to the
Transsexuals Act (TSG) of 1980. He underwent a sex-change operation in 2002.
Following this, he applied for a determination according to the Transsexuals Act that
he is to be deemed female. According to § 8.1 no. 2 TSG, however, the determination
and legal recognition of the other gender affiliation was contingent on the person con-
cerned not being married. The applicant and his spouse, however, did not intend to
divorce, since their longstanding relationship was intact. In fact, they enjoyed consider-
able companionship together, and provided mutual psycho-social support.
In response to a submission by the Sch€oneberg Local Court (Amtsgericht), which
considered itself to be prevented from complying with the applicant’s application in
light of the statutory requirement of applicants having to be unmarried, the First
Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court reached the conclusion that § 8.1 no. 2 TSG
was unconstitutional. It found that it was unreasonable to expect the legal recognition
of the altered gender of a married transgender person to be conditional on them
divorcing their spouse, with whom they are united by law, and with whom they wish
to remain together, without being enabled to continue their marriage partnership. It
imposes on a married transsexual who only discovered their transsexuality during the
subsistence of an existing marriage, and who had undergone sex reassignment surgery,
restrictions in asserting and exercising their right to be recognised as belonging to
a different gender than the one assigned to them at birth.29 This burdens them with
the alternative of either maintaining their marriage, despite a physical sex change
already having taken place, or not to receive legal recognition of their new gender iden-
tity. Alternatively, they would have to divorce in order to receive legal recognition,
even if the spouses wished to remain united by marriage. The burden imposed by the
requirement of divorce was held to be disproportionate and therefore unconstitu-
tional,30 and the legislature was instructed to remedy the unconstitutional situation by
1 August 2009.
As mentioned, under the same law (TSG) it was also required, among other things,
that an applicant for alteration of a sex status must have undergone a surgical proced-
ure that alters their external sexual characteristics, and through which a clear
27 The distinction between the ‘small’ solution and the ‘big’ solution is described in BVerfGE 128, 109 (2011)
(Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) para 29). See further A Dutta ‘Germany’ in J Sherpe (ed) The Legal
Status of Transgender Persons (2015) 207.
28 BVerfGE 121, 175 (2008) (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany).
29 Ibid para 41, 53, 54 and 60.
30 Ibid para 46.
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approximation with the appearance associated with the required sex is achieved.
Applicants were also required to provide proof of infertility. However, the relationship
between that person and their parents and descendants would remain unaltered. This
position changed in 2011 in a second Constitutional Court case.31
The complainant in the intersex case, who was 62 years old at the time of the hear-
ing, was assigned male at birth and later came to identify herself as female. Her sexual
orientation was that of a female homosexual, and she was living in a partnership with
a woman. In accordance with § 1 TSG, she changed to one that she felt affirmed her
gender. No change of civil status (big solution) had taken place because the necessary
surgery had not been performed. Together with her partner, she applied for the regis-
tration of a civil partnership, which was refused by the registrar on the grounds that
a civil partnership was exclusively reserved for two parties of the same gender. The
Local Court (Amtsgericht) confirmed the decision, arguing that the only possibility
open to the parties concerned was that of entering into a marriage, because the com-
plainant’s recognition as a woman under the law of civil status required sex reassign-
ment surgery.
The complainant essentially challenged a violation of her general right of personality
in its manifestation as the right to gender self-determination. She argued that she
wanted to enter into a civil partnership as a woman, whose partner is a woman. She
further argued that it is unreasonable to expect of her to enter into a marriage because,
as a consequence, she would legally be regarded as a man. Furthermore, her name
change, to one typically associated with the female gender, would disclose that one of
the two women in the partnership is transsexual, which would make it impossible to
live an inconspicuous life free from discrimination in the new role. Due to her age, sex
reassignment surgery would involve incalculable health risks.
The German Constitutional Court ruled that a person did not need either sex
reassignment surgery or sterilisation in order to legally change their gender.32 The
Court held that these two requirements, too, were unconstitutional, as they imposed an
excessive burden on transsexual persons to undergo surgery and to tolerate health det-
riments, even if this is not indicated in their respective case, and when it is not neces-
sary for ascertaining the permanent nature of the transsexuality.33
Related matters have surfaced in other forums too. In 2014, the European Court on
Human Rights was faced with a challenge based on an alleged breach of the right to
respect for family and private life under the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter ECHR) (1950) in H€am€al€ainen
v Finland.34 Under Finnish law, same-sex couples are not permitted to marry
although they may contract a civil partnership, marriage being reserved for relation-
ships between one man and one woman. The applicant, who was assigned male at
birth, married (in 1996), and the couple had a child; thereafter, the applicant had tran-
sitioned to female. She underwent sex reassignment surgery and changed her first
31 BVerfGE 128 (n 28 above). For further discussion see Dutta (n 27 above) 214–215 and H Botha ‘Beyond sexual
binaries? The German federal constitutional court and the rights of intersex people’ (2018) 21 Potchefstroom
Electronic Law Journal 1, 7.
32 Dutta (n 27 above) 214.
33 Hormone therapy is a recognised way of altering some of the external appearances of one’s gender.
34 H€am€al€ainen v Finland 2014 ECHR 787.
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name. However, she was unable to change her identity number to a female one without
getting divorced, or without her wife consenting to transforming the marriage into
a civil partnership. But the applicant and her spouse wished to remain married, as
divorce was against their religion, and they were of the view that a civil partnership did
not provide the same security as a marriage. It was alleged that this was a violation of
art 8 (right to private and family life) read with art 14 (prohibition of discrimination)
of the ECHR. At stake was the question whether there was a positive obligation upon
the state to provide a procedure to enable the applicant to have her new gender legally
recognised, while remaining married.
The starting point for the European Court was to reiterate that the ECHR did not
impose an obligation on the member states to allow same-sex marriage. Therefore, the
consequent regulation of any effect of a change of gender in the context of marriage
would fall within the margin of appreciation of the state. This is due to the lack of con-
sensus in Europe on allowing same-sex marriage and a lack of consensus among those
states that do allow same-sex marriage as to what the effects of a gender transition in
the context of a pre-existing marriage would be.
The main complaint raised by the applicant was directed at the possibility of con-
verting the marriage to a civil partnership (leaving aside maintaining the status quo, or
getting divorced). According to the Court, under Finnish law, the conversion was auto-
matic once the other spouse’s consent had been provided. The requirement of her con-
sent was intended to protect her from unilateral decisions taken by the other spouse.
Nor, the Court found, were any other rights (pension rights, for instance) affected by
a conversion. The child already born of the marriage would not have any pre-existing
rights related to care, custody or maintenance prejudiced – for this reason, there
would be no implications for the applicant’s right to family life were the marriage to
be converted. And, since the genuine possibility of conversion existed, the Court
could not find that the Finnish system was deficient from the point of view of the
state’s positive obligation, nor that the precondition of consent to conversion was dis-
proportionate. Hence, no violation was found, and the application was dismissed.
A court in the Netherlands has also encountered a challenge based on art 8 of the
ECHR and a transgender person transitioning in a subsisting marriage.35 In this case,
the couple had been married since 1985, and the spouse had transitioned to the male
gender. In 2013, the Limburg court had ordered an alteration of the birth certificate to
reflect his male gender. In that court order, too, the first names of the applicant were
altered to better reflect the gender with which he identified.
A subsequent complaint in 2015 was founded on the refusal of the authorities to
effect an ex post facto change to the original marriage certificate to reflect the new situ-
ation. The refusal of the authorities was based on the applicable article of the Dutch
Civil Code,36 which referred expressly to the possibility of alteration of gender on birth
certificates, but not to marriage certificates.37 Countering this, the applicant stated that,
with his request, he did not intend to add to the marriage certificate a later reference
35 C/03/200177 (Court of Limburg).
36 Article 1. 28c of the Dutch Civil Code.
37 Dutch law had been changed to allow educational certificates and diplomas already awarded to be altered ex
post facto to reflect the new name assigned to a person who had transitioned to a new gender (in 2013).
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concerning the change of his sex, but that he wanted to have his sex changed on the
marriage certificate itself. Because there is now a marriage between two men, that must
be respected on the basis of art 8 of the ECHR, he averred, and the marriage certificate
should be changed in accordance with this factual situation.
In its assessment, the Court noted that Dutch law has a closed system of civil status
documents, and officials are bound to give effect to the express wording of the Civil
Code.38 While there is provision for a court, at the request of an interested party, to
order the correction of a deed in the registers of civil status, or subsequent mention
that is incomplete or contains a mistake, there can be no question of a mistake regard-
ing the designation of the applicant in the marriage certificate as ‘bride’ and ‘daughter
of’, when the applicant at the time of the original marriage had at least the external sex
characteristics often associated with the category of female.
Referring expressly to the regime created in the Civil Code as an ex nunc one (not
of retrospective operation, as deliberately decided at the time of amendments relating
to alteration of gender in 2013 for reasons of legal certainty and because the interests
of third parties, including the children of transgender people, could be affected),39 the
Court cited the changes to educational diplomas and birth certificates as ones that the
legislator had explicitly considered, while preserving the principle that the consequen-
ces for transgender persons arising from the part of the Civil Code that concerns pri-
vate and family law do not have retroactive effect. In this light, the Court held that it
would go far beyond the scope of its mandate to develop the law if the Court allowed
the petition. The Legislature had considered and pronounced on the prospective nature
of gender alteration in the context of private and family law. The Court was of the
view that the legislative scheme adopted was in compliance with the 2010 European
Committee of Minister’s recommendation that full legal recognition of transgender
people’s documentation is necessary to the extent that ‘offici€ele sleuteldocumenten,
zoals school- en werkdiploma’s, op een snelle, transparante en toegankelijke manier
kunnen worden bijgesteld’.40 Hence the claim to a human rights violation was
not sustained.
3. Discussion of issues raised by the cases in relation to KOS
The cited foreign cases raise several issues for consideration. The issue of changing
identificatory details on a range of documentation – education diplomas and certifi-
cates, passports, birth certificates and marriage certificates – is one theme, but save for
the question as to changes to a marriage certificate, the other documentation issues fall
outside the scope of this article.41 Whether changes to a gender on a marriage certifi-
cate must be recorded retroactively does have some relevance to the conclusion in KOS
38 C/03/200177 (see n 35 above) 6–7.
39 Ibid 6.
40 Ibid 7. The quotation refers to the need for key official documents, such as school and work diplomas to be
ascertained in a quick, transparent and accessible manner.
41 Section 2 of the Alteration Act refers only to changes to the birth register, but presumably that would lay a basis
for changes to identification documents, including a passport. However, s 3(2) confirms that changes are from the
date of recording of such alteration; therefore, presumably, education certificates already awarded do not qualify
for alteration.
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that the fact of a marriage (its solemnisation and registration) are historical events
only, and that the course of history cannot be changed (retrospectively). Hence, were
a South African court to be confronted with an application similar to that in the
Netherlands, based on the reasoning in KOS, one must conclude that the marriage
certificate or register will remain reflective of the gender details as they were at the
time of that marriage. This is also the position in the Alteration Act, namely that
changes operate prospectively only.
Second, as was decided in Germany, it is now established in KOS that the existence
of a dual marriage system for heterosexual and for same-sex couples does not entail the
need for a divorce if the parties were married under the Marriage Act. Nor does an
application under the Alteration Act convert the marriage to a civil union (as under
Finnish law). As regards the issue of accessing civil partnership status (which is
reserved for same-sex couples in many European countries) when sex reassignment
surgery is incomplete (in other words hormone treatment has commenced, but surgery
has not taken place), it is clear that the fact that civil unions in South Africa may be
concluded by either different or same-sex couples means that the gender status of
would-be civil union partners would theoretically be irrelevant. The facts in the second
German case would thus (again theoretically) not arise. A change of gender would not
in any way affect the existence of a civil union concluded in South Africa.
But the question can still be asked whether South Africa’s constitutional and
domestic legal regime does not throw up different answers with respect to the exist-
ence of a dual marriage regime than would arise in a European context. The decision
of the European Court on Human Rights was that where parallel and equal marriage
systems exist for different and same-sex couples, a conversion option (that is virtually
automatic, save for the consent of the existing partner) is not disproportionate and
overly burdensome. There is, thus, neither violation of the right to private and family
life nor discrimination.
The Dutch decision may be relevant to the further discussion of the constitutionality
of a dual marriage regime. In the Netherlands, the prospective regime preserved for
private and family law (in the context of the refusal to order alteration of the original
marriage certificate to reflect the altered gender) indicates an intention to keep the two
marriage forms for same-sex and different-sex couples separate, at least as regards their
historical existence (at the time of conclusion of the marriage, the sex description of
the parties was correct). As already discussed, this is the evident position taken in the
Alteration Act too. However, the closed nature of the Dutch civil registry and lack of
discretion or latitude awarded to civil registry officials (in the context of a civil law sys-
tem), coupled with the expressed intent of the Legislature to treat private and family
law concerns differently to identity documents and other documentation, explains the
ultimate finding of the Dutch court. A constitutional reading might yield a different
answer to the question as to whether maintaining two marriage regimes in South
Africa does not violate the equality clause.42
42 The South African Law Reform Commission notes that marriage is ‘[h]istorically dominant [… ] in terms of the
1961 Marriage Act’; see SALRC ‘Single marriage statute’ (2019) para 1.29 <http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/
ip35_prj144_SingleMarriageStatute.pdf>
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It seems that the parliamentary decision, made after the Constitutional Court’s find-
ing of the underinclusivity of the Marriage Act,43 to enact a separate statute governing
civil unions (rather than read in the words ‘spouse’ to the marriage formula) has given
rise to consequences that may not have been expected.44 This is due to the ‘knock on’
effect that is presented by transgender persons wishing to alter their official gender,
while remaining in an existing marriage concluded under the Marriage Act. The judg-
ment in KOS argues that the two separate pieces of legislation relating to marriage
forms do not create separate parallel marriage systems, but only signify that there is
a dual solemnisation system.45 It was not necessary on the facts to decide of this case
whether the dual system so created was constitutionally compatible. Although this point
has previously been argued,46 a seeming oddness is created by the two solemnisation sys-
tems, where one is purportedly reserved exclusively for heterosexual couples, but such
reservation is rendered mythical at a future point, because one party applies for a sex
alteration; the result is the perpetuation of a marriage that is not compatible with the
constituent requirements of this legal family form in South African law.
In essence, the ruling in this case (correct though it was) fundamentally alters the
very scheme that the legislator sought to bring about, namely to ‘insulate’ heterosexual
marriages from infiltration by same-sex couples. This means that where a sex change
application is granted for partners in a subsisting marriage, without them having to get
divorced, the de facto outward situation will resemble all intents a same-sex civil union
but will remain a marriage. This, of course, is also the position taken by the German
Constitutional Court.
It is discernible that in the first German case, in H€am€al€ainen as well as in KOS, there
are indications that the institution of marriage is regarded by some as the ‘superior’
institution, which may, at least in part, explain the parties’ reluctance to divorce (or
43 Lesbian and Gay Equality Project (n 11 above).
44 However, the existence of separate and parallel marriage regimes is not unique to South Africa, as the case law
discussed shows. See further I Curry-Sumner ‘A patchwork of partnerships’ in KB Woelki & A Fuchs (eds) Legal
Recognition of Same Sex Relationships in Europe: National, Cross-border and European Perspectives 2 ed (2012) 80.
Ian Curry-Sumner distinguishes three models of legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, which he terms
pluralistic, dualistic and monastic models. In these terms, South Africa’s system would be characterised as
pluralistic, insofar as same-sex and heterosexual couples are offered the chance to register a civil partnership,
while leaving pre-existing marriage legislation intact (Curry-Sumner terms this the first phase of a pluralistic
system). The second phase would be opening civil marriage to same-sex couples too. Curry-Sumner does concede
that in the first phase of pluralism, ‘the discrimination faced by same sex couples in not being able to marry is
simply replaced by a new form of discrimination; although different-sex couples are faced with a choice of
relationship forms, same-sex couples are not’ (Curry-Sumner 2012, 87). Interestingly, though, he concludes his
analysis by applauding the South African approach because couples are provided with one legal institution but
two different nomenclatures (that is, they can call their union a marriage or civil union).
45 And distinguishing the Civil Union Act is the controversial provision in art 6 of the Civil Union Act that a marriage
officer ex officio may notify the Minister that they object on grounds of conscience, religion and belief to
solemnising a civil union between two persons of the same sex, whereupon they will not be obliged to
solemnise such a civil union. As at 30 April 2018, there were 1,131 marriage officers in South Africa, of whom 421
had been granted exemption from officiating in same-sex civil unions (Legalbrief 30 April 2018). Abolition of the
exemption was the subject of a private member’s bill in parliament (Bill 11 of 2018) that sought to remove s 6. It
was argued that civil marriage officers are employees of the state and should not be allowed to opt out of
performing civil unions on the basis of their conscience. This could be seen as an endorsement by the state of
unfair discrimination, because a civil marriage officer must solemnise all (heterosexual) marriages placed before
him or her and is not allowed to refuse to solemnise a marriage on the grounds of conscience, religion or belief.
The Bill was passed in October 2018. <https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/civil-union-amendment-bill-2018-
parliamentary-subm>.
46 See for instance, P de Vos & J Barnard ‘Same sex marriage, civil unions and domestic partnerships: Critical
reflections on an ongoing saga’ (2007) 124 South African Law Journal 794, 822.
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convert to a civil union).47 Does this perception – even if commonly held – have any
bearing on the constitutionality of having two regimes? Any assertion of unconstitu-
tionality might be more difficult to justify if the differentiation between the two
regimes does not result in inferior legal consequences but exists only in the mind of
public opinion (even if in the opinion of those ultimately affected).
It was necessary to make the civil union regime available to same-sex and different-
sex partners as an inevitable corollary of the Fourie judgment, which warned against
a scheme for same-sex partners only, and which would then reinforce existing marginal-
isation and exclusion of same-sex people.48 Separate but equal would not do: this would
serve ‘as a threadbare cloak for covering distaste for or repudiation by those in power of
the group subjected to segregation’.49 This was also reflect of the distasteful past under
apartheid, during which mixed racial marriages were proscribed.
But does the ‘separate but equal’ provision for civil unions and different-sex mar-
riages render the scheme unconstitutional? The fact remains that different-sex couples
have a choice of marriage regime, while same-sex couples do not. Since there is differ-
entiation based on one of the listed grounds in s 9 of the Constitution,50 the burden of
justifying the infringement shifts to the party raising it, and it will be necessary to
examine the impact of the differential treatment, especially on the dignity of the com-
plainant group. This will be assessed in light of the history of marginalisation and
oppression of the affected group, including whether the differentiation signals that that
group is somehow worthy of less concern and respect than others in society, in order
to determine whether the discrimination is unfair.
It is arguable that due to the past discrimination against same-sex couples, their
exclusion from marriage under the Marriage Act – unless they undergo an alteration of
gender – might render the overall scheme constitutionally suspect.51 This could be
reinforced by the fact that different-sex couples have a choice of legal regimes, and by
the finding in KOS that an alteration of sex of one party to a marriage does not result
in any change to the marriage status of that couple.
47 De Vos & Barnard (ibid 821) argue: ‘One is tempted to ask why the Marriage Act has been retained in
circumstances where the Constitutional Court held explicitly that it is the Marriage Act and the common law
definition of marriage that is unconstitutional. Invariably, the signal that is sent out to society is that somehow
heterosexual couples remain “special” or “superior” in that they have the choice (and in fact the need) to
separate or exclude themselves from “tainted” and “inferior” homosexual couples’. There may, of course, be other
reasons for not wishing to divorce and convert the union to another form, for example that the parties see no
need to do so and are content with their existing position. See SALRC (n 42 above). In para 1.28 in this
document, the SALRC refers to the hierarchical system of marriage and family laws, with historical privilege being
accorded certain European derived forms of marriage.
48 De Vos & Barnard (ibid) 805.
49 SALRC ‘Report on domestic partnerships’ (March 2006) 292, 296 & 305 <http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_
prj118_2006march.pdf>. See also Fourie (n 11 above) 580 E–F.
50 Differentiation on the basis of sexual orientation.
51 Henriet de Ru (2010) submits that the ‘Civil Union Act is a “separate and unequal” act which confers a second-
class marital status upon same-sex couples and further produces new forms of oppression and repudiation. This is
clearly in conflict with the guiding principles of the Constitutional Court that the legislature should not provide
a remedy that in its context and application would produce new forms of marginalisation. In instances where
individuals were already subjected to past unfair discrimination and never provided with equal concern and
respect because of personal characteristics, for example, homosexual orientation, any additional differential
treatment imposed by legislation increases their unfair social characterisation and accordingly has a more
severe impact on them, since they are already vulnerable’; H de Ru ‘The Civil Union Act 17 of 2006:
A transformative Act of a substandard product of a failed conciliation between social, legal and political issues’
(2010) 73 Journal of Contemporary Roman Dutch Law 553, 566.
12 J. SLOTH-NIELSEN
However, it must be borne in mind that Binns Ward AJ concluded that the two
legislative enactments do not create parallel marriage systems (but merely different
routes to solemnisation).52 This finding may have a bearing on the question (were it to
arise) as to the constitutionality of the separate marriage regimes, since it is, in essence,
a finding that there are only different solemnisation paths established by the Marriage
Act and the Civil Union Act.53 The KOS decision could, therefore, potentially obstruct
any constitutional challenge to the underinclusivity of the Marriage Act to same-
sex couples.
However, this may in time become moot, as the recent SALRC issue paper outlining
the possibility of a unified, harmonised or single marriage statute would appear to indi-
cate.54 This statute would potentially cover all marriage forms, including religious and
customary marriages, civil unions and marriages currently solemnised under the
Marriage Act. However, a long path must still be walked before that becomes a reality.
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52 This is a rather technical and potentially artificial understanding of the effects of a marriage and of a civil union
respectively. In common parlance, we do not understand people to be ‘solemnised’ but ‘married’, with the
variable and invariable consequences that flow from that.
53 However, the court’s approach does accord with the attitude taken in the foreign jurisdictions discussed earlier,
notably that sex alteration operates prospectively.
54 See n 42 above.
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